69 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2014 Last revised: 5 Aug 2016
Date Written: August 2016
In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, agency costs, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G30, G31, G35, K22, L21, M14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ferrell, Allen and Liang, Hao and Renneboog, Luc, Socially Responsible Firms (August 2016). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 432/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2464561 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464561