Informed Consent and the Differential Diagnosis: How the Law Overestimates Patient Autonomy and Compromises Health Care

93 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2014 Last revised: 6 Sep 2014

Marc Ginsberg

The John Marshall Law School

Date Written: July 10, 2014

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is not simply to re-examine the doctrine of informed consent. The purpose, however, is to identify how the doctrine has evolved, its scope expanded, and how it has created serious consequences for physicians and patients. Specifically, this paper focuses on the differential diagnosis - the process by which a physician arrives at a diagnosis - and how some jurisdictions have manipulated informed consent to encompass this process. This paper will urge that the application of informed consent to the differential diagnosis is an unnecessary expansion of the doctrine and, potentially, compromises health care.

Suggested Citation

Ginsberg, Marc, Informed Consent and the Differential Diagnosis: How the Law Overestimates Patient Autonomy and Compromises Health Care (July 10, 2014). Wayne Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2464735 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464735

Marc Ginsberg (Contact Author)

The John Marshall Law School ( email )

315 South Plymouth Court
Chicago, IL 60604
United States

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