The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance

ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE - LENIENCY RELIGION (Caron Beaton-Wells and Christopher Tran, editors, Hart Publishing 2015).

14 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2014 Last revised: 18 Dec 2015

Howard Bergman

Howard J. Bergman Consulting

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

Date Written: September 29, 2014

Abstract

Cartel enforcement and leniency are issues of increased academic attention. Most of the academic work in this area focuses on scholarship regarding formal modeling of leniency, empirical work, and analyses of broader legal theories, analytical trends and specific decisions. Scholarship has not focused on how leniency works in practice to detect wrongdoing and how robust and effective compliance programs may be used as a tool to take advantage of leniency. This chapter fills in the gap by offering a case study of an effective compliance program that uncovered what was at the time the largest ever international cartel. To do so, the authors undertook interviews with the legal team of Lufthansa, the leniency applicant in the air cargo conspiracy.

Keywords: compliance, cartels, leniency, antitrust, competition, collusion

JEL Classification: K21, L41, M14

Suggested Citation

Bergman, Howard and Sokol, D. Daniel, The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance (September 29, 2014). ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE - LENIENCY RELIGION (Caron Beaton-Wells and Christopher Tran, editors, Hart Publishing 2015).. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2465012

Howard Bergman

Howard J. Bergman Consulting ( email )

101 Quay Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
United States

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )

200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
472
Rank
47,607
Abstract Views
1,559