Choice, Internal Consistency and Ratinality

Econpmics and Philosophy (2011), 27: 123 - 149

32 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2014

See all articles by Aditi Bhattacharyya

Aditi Bhattacharyya

Sam Houston State University - College of Business Administration - Department of Economics and International Business

Prasanta K. Pattanaik

University of California, Riverside (UCR) - Department of Economics

Yongsheng Xu

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

The classical theory of rational choice is built on several important internal consistency conditions. In recent years, the reasonableness of those internal consistency conditions has been questioned and criticized, and several responses to accommodate such criticisms have been proposed in the literature. This paper develops a general framework to accommodate the issues raised by the criticisms of classical rational choice theory, and examines the broad impact of these criticisms from both normative and positive points of view.

Keywords: choice, internal consistency, rationality, distinguishability, menu-dependent criteria and information

JEL Classification: D0, D1

Suggested Citation

Bhattacharyya, Aditi and Pattanaik, Prasanta K. and Xu, Yongsheng, Choice, Internal Consistency and Ratinality (2009). Econpmics and Philosophy (2011), 27: 123 - 149, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2465301

Aditi Bhattacharyya (Contact Author)

Sam Houston State University - College of Business Administration - Department of Economics and International Business ( email )

SHSU Box 2118
Huntsville, TX 77341-2118
United States

Prasanta K. Pattanaik

University of California, Riverside (UCR) - Department of Economics ( email )

900 University Avenue
4136 Sproul Hall
Riverside, CA 92521
United States
909-787-5037 x1592 (Phone)
909-787-5685 (Fax)

Yongsheng Xu

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )

Department of Economics
35 Broad Street, 6th Floor Department of Economics
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States

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