Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466822
 


 



Rivalry, Polycentricism, and Institutional Evolution


Peter J. Boettke


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Rosolino A. Candela


George Mason University

March 15, 2014

Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 1-19 (2015)

Abstract:     
We argue that the future of Austrian political economy rests on the study of how institutional entrepreneurs discover and implement alternative institutional arrangements conducive to economic growth. This requires a dual level of analysis in spontaneous order studies. How such institutional arrangements manifest themselves is ultimately an empirical question. As a progressive research program, Austrian political economy will entail cross-fertilization with other empirical branches of political economy that illustrate its own central theoretical contributions to political economy, namely economic calculation, entrepreneurship, and spontaneous order by having applied to the constitutional level of analysis. Accordingly, we argue that such cross-fertilization with the work of Ronald Coase and Elinor Ostrom will further expound the institutional counterpart of “rivalry” in the market process, namely polycentricism and its empirical manifestation. Understanding the distinct relationship between rivalry and polycentricism will provide the central theoretical underpinning of institutional evolution.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: Legal Institutions, James Buchanan, Ronald Coase, Elinor Ostrom, F.A Hayek, Austrian political economy

JEL Classification: K4, B3, B53, P51


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Date posted: July 16, 2014 ; Last revised: February 28, 2016

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Candela, Rosolino A., Rivalry, Polycentricism, and Institutional Evolution (March 15, 2014). Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 1-19 (2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2466822

Contact Information

Peter J. Boettke
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)
Rosolino A. Candela (Contact Author)
George Mason University ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
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