A Controlled Field Experiment on Corruption

European Economic Review, 55(8), p. 1072-1082. DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007

Posted: 17 Jul 2014

See all articles by Amadou Boly

Amadou Boly

African Development Bank

Olivier Armantier

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes, while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous: it lowers the bribe's acceptance, but it fosters reciprocation. Monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but we cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Finally, our results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption including age, ability, religiosity, but not gender.

Keywords: Corruption, Experimental economics, Field experiments

JEL Classification: C91, C93, D73, I20

Suggested Citation

Boly, Amadou and Armantier, Olivier, A Controlled Field Experiment on Corruption (2011). European Economic Review, 55(8), p. 1072-1082. DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466849

Amadou Boly (Contact Author)

African Development Bank ( email )

Rue Joseph Anoma
Abidjan, Ivory Coast 01 BP 1387
Ivory Coast (Cote D'ivoire)

Olivier Armantier

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

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