A Controlled Field Experiment on Corruption
European Economic Review, 55(8), p. 1072-1082. DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007
Posted: 17 Jul 2014
Date Written: 2011
This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes, while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous: it lowers the bribe's acceptance, but it fosters reciprocation. Monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but we cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Finally, our results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption including age, ability, religiosity, but not gender.
Keywords: Corruption, Experimental economics, Field experiments
JEL Classification: C91, C93, D73, I20
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation