Person-Organization Fit and Incentives: A Causal Test

Posted: 17 Jul 2014

See all articles by Ola Andersson

Ola Andersson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Uppsala University - Department of Economics

Marieke Huysentruyt

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)

Topi Miettinen

Hanken School of Economics - Helsinki Graduate School of Economics

Ute Stephan

Aston University - Aston Business School

Date Written: February 27, 2014

Abstract

We investigate the effects of organizational culture and personal value orientations on performance under individual and team contest incentives. We develop a model of regard for others and in-group favoritism predicting interaction effects between organizational culture and personal values in the contest games. The predictions are tested in a computerized lab experiment with exogenous control of both organizational culture and incentives. In line with our theoretical model we find that prosocial (proself) orientated subjects exert more (less) effort in team contests in the primed prosocial organizational culture condition, relative to the neutrally primed baseline condition. Further, when the prosocial organizational culture is combined with individual contest incentives, prosocial subjects no longer outperform their proself counterparts. These findings provide a first, affirmative, causal test of person-organization fit theory. They also suggest the importance of a 'triple-fit' between personal preferences, organizational culture and incentive mechanisms for prosocially orientated individuals.

Keywords: Tournaments, Organizational culture, Personal values, Person-organization fit, Teams, Economic incentives

JEL Classification: C91, D02, D23, J33, M52

Suggested Citation

Andersson, Ola and Andersson, Ola and Huysentruyt, Marieke E/Els and Miettinen, Topi and Stephan, Ute, Person-Organization Fit and Incentives: A Causal Test (February 27, 2014). IFN Working Paper No. 1010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466993

Ola Andersson (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
+46 (0)8-665 45 21 (Phone)
+46 8-665 45 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ifn.se/medarbetare/forskare/ola-andersson

Uppsala University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

Marieke E/Els Huysentruyt

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 6727 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 6951 (Fax)

Topi Miettinen

Hanken School of Economics - Helsinki Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Helsinki
Finland

Ute Stephan

Aston University - Aston Business School ( email )

Aston Triangle
Birmingham, B47ET
United Kingdom

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