Spillovers in Regional Fisheries Management: Do Catch Shares Cause Leakage?
Duke Environmental and Energy Economics Working Paper Series No. EE 14-03
43 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2014
Date Written: June 2014
United States fisheries are managed by regional councils. Fishermen can participate in fisheries managed by multiple councils, and effort controls in one region could lead to effort leakage into another. Using difference-in-differences, we test for leakage across regional fisheries boundaries for a catch share program in New England. We find evidence that the New England groundfish sector program caused leakage into adjacent Mid-Atlantic fisheries. Aggregate Mid-Atlantic harvest volume and landed values increased among sector members after the policy change. Leakage is most acute in fisheries with low institutional barriers, similar gear, and high market substitutability with sector species.
Keywords: catch shares, cooperatives, difference-in-difference, regional policies, interjurisdictional differentials
JEL Classification: Q22, Q28, H73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation