Unintended Consequences of Enforcement in Illicit Markets

10 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2014

See all articles by James E. Prieger

James E. Prieger

Pepperdine University - School of Public Policy

Jonathan Kulick

Marron Institute

Date Written: July 17, 2014

Abstract

Legal enforcement of bans on goods can reduce the size of the black market but lead to greater violence by increasing revenue in the illicit market. However, the link between enforcement and violence is not as simple as is suggested by the textbook model, even for a competitive market. Nevertheless, under plausible assumptions more enforcement on trafficking in the illicit good leads to more violence.

Keywords: black markets, enforcement, violence

JEL Classification: K420, H89

Suggested Citation

Prieger, James E. and Kulick, Jonathan, Unintended Consequences of Enforcement in Illicit Markets (July 17, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2467898 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2467898

James E. Prieger (Contact Author)

Pepperdine University - School of Public Policy ( email )

24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263
United States
3105067150 (Phone)
3105067494 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/pepperdine.edu/jprieger/

Jonathan Kulick

Marron Institute ( email )

196 Mercer St.
New York, NY 10012
United States

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