The Absent-Minded Prisoner

Greifswald Economics Working Paper No. 14/98

20 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2000

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1998

Abstract

If one of two rational players is absent-minded for at least three rounds, cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma with a finite number of repetitions is possible. If both players are absent-minded, even two rounds of absent-mindedness can be enough for cooperation in these rounds and all rounds before. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a cooperative equilibrium are derived, a plausible interpretation of absent-mindedness in the case of many repetitions is given.

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Dilger, Alexander, The Absent-Minded Prisoner (November 1998). Greifswald Economics Working Paper No. 14/98. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=246811 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.246811

Alexander Dilger (Contact Author)

University of Münster ( email )

Institute for Organisational Economics
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