Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The Case of Administrative Review

26 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2014

See all articles by Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Fernando Gomez-Pomar

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Date Written: July 22, 2014

Abstract

This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000-2008. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seems inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is not strongly politically aligned and favors consensus, formalism and dissent avoidance. We suggest that our empirical analysis mitigates the myth of political insulation by career judges.

Keywords: career judges, judicial behavior, empirical legal studies, Spanish Supreme Court, ideal point, ideology

Suggested Citation

Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia and Garoupa, Nuno and Gomez-Pomar, Fernando, Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The Case of Administrative Review (July 22, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2469883 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2469883

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Fernando Gomez-Pomar

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
08005 Barcelona
Spain
(34-93) 542 16 47 (Phone)
(34-93) 542 17 31 (Fax)

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