On the Need for a Fiscal Backstop to the Banking System

This paper is published as a chapter in: Research Handbook on Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, edited by Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 42-54.

Duisenberg School of Finance Policy Paper No. 44

13 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2014 Last revised: 16 Jan 2016

See all articles by Dirk Schoenmaker

Dirk Schoenmaker

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 23, 2014

Abstract

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, governments are rightly reducing their exposure to the banking system. Bail-in arrangements should ensure that shareholders and creditors take the first losses. The next line of defence is a resolution fund, which is filled via levies on banks. Nevertheless, we argue that a fiscal backstop remains necessary for a banking system, as private arrangements may not be sufficient in a severe crisis. Without a credible backstop, depositors will run on a troubled banking system causing a bad equilibrium with a full breakdown of the banking system. Only the government can provide such a credible backstop.

Keywords: Fiscal backstop, financial crisis, banking, lender of last resort, euro

JEL Classification: E58, E62, F33, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Schoenmaker, Dirk, On the Need for a Fiscal Backstop to the Banking System (July 23, 2014). This paper is published as a chapter in: Research Handbook on Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, edited by Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 42-54.; Duisenberg School of Finance Policy Paper No. 44. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470463

Dirk Schoenmaker (Contact Author)

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.rsm.nl/people/dirk-schoenmaker/

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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