The Fiscal Cost of Weak Governance: Evidence from Teacher Absence in India

45 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2014

See all articles by Karthik Muralidharan

Karthik Muralidharan

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Jishnu Das

Georgetown University; Georgetown University

Alaka Holla

World Bank; Brown University; Innovations for Poverty Action

Aakash Mohpal

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2014

Abstract

We construct a new nationally-representative panel dataset of schools across 1297 villages in India and find that the large investments in public primary education over the past decade have led to substantial improvements in input-based measures of school quality, including infrastructure, pupil-teacher ratios, and monitoring. However, teacher absence continues to be high, with 23.6 percent of teachers in public schools across rural India being absent during unannounced visits to schools. Improvements in school infrastructure and service conditions are not correlated with lower teacher absence. We find two robust correlations in the nationally-representative panel data that corroborate findings from smaller-scale experiments. First, reductions in pupil-teacher ratios are correlated with increased teacher absence. Second, increases in the frequency of inspections are strongly correlated with lower teacher absence. We estimate that the fiscal cost of teacher absence in India is around $1.5 billion per year, and that investing in better governance by hiring more inspectors to increase the frequency of monitoring could be over ten times more cost effective at increasing teacher-student contact time (net of teacher absence) than hiring more teachers.

Suggested Citation

Muralidharan, Karthik and Das, Jishnu and Holla, Alaka and Mohpal, Aakash, The Fiscal Cost of Weak Governance: Evidence from Teacher Absence in India (July 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20299, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2471192

Karthik Muralidharan (Contact Author)

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Jishnu Das

Georgetown University ( email )

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Alaka Holla

World Bank ( email )

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Aakash Mohpal

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

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