34 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2000
Date Written: October 23, 2000
The special concept of trust does not provide a distinct justification for mandatory legal rules. Although regulation might lead parties to decide to rely on others, it does not produce the sort of transaction-cost-reducing trust that should matter for public policy - that is, trust based on altruism, norms, personal relationships, and social capital. Moreover, using mandatory rules to increase trust may have precisely the opposite effect of increasing distrust and undermining trust-creation devices. Thus, trust provides an additional argument in favor of enforcing contracts.
JEL Classification: D6, G3, K0, K2, K3, L5
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ribstein, Larry E., Law v. Trust (October 23, 2000). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-38. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=247224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.247224