Targeted Campaign Competition, Loyal Voters, and Supermajorities

33 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2014 Last revised: 6 Oct 2016

Pierre Boyer

Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Brian Roberson

Purdue University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 2014

Abstract

We examine an endogenous, sunk budget extension of Myerson's (1993) two-candidate model of political competition in which candidates simultaneously allocate an exogenous level of a use-it-or-lose-it persuasive advertising resource across a homogeneous electorate of unit measure. We completely characterize equilibrium for the majoritarian objective game and compare that to the vote-share maximizing game. In the standard zero-sum formulation of the game, the majoritarian and vote-share maximizing objective games share the same unique equilibrium which features micro-targeting, or in Myersonian terms the cultivation of favored minorities. With endogenous campaign spending, the zero-sum feature of the Myerson game is eliminated and the equilibria arising in the games under each of the two objectives qualitatively differ. In comparing the equilibria under these two objectives, our results support the puzzling phenomenon of the emergence of supermajorities in majoritarian systems.

Keywords: Campaign competition, continuous General Lotto game, vote buying, flexible budgets, supermajorities

JEL Classification: D72, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Boyer, Pierre and Konrad, Kai A. and Roberson, Brian, Targeted Campaign Competition, Loyal Voters, and Supermajorities (August 1, 2014). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2014-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2474987 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2474987

Pierre C. Boyer

Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics ( email )

Route de Saclay
Palaiseau, 91120
France

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
Berlin, 10785
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/fff/people/kai_konrad.en.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Brian Roberson

Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

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