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Ownership and Control of German Corporations

62 Pages Posted: 29 Dec 2000  

Julian R. Franks

London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer

University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Oxford - Said Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 25, 2000

Abstract

In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relation of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the UK and US. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.

Notes: Previously titled "Ownership, Control and the Performance of German Corporations"

Keywords: Ownership, control, board turnover, pyramiding, bank control, takeovers

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Franks, Julian R. and Mayer, Colin, Ownership and Control of German Corporations (September 25, 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=247501 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.247501

Julian R. Franks (Contact Author)

London Business School ( email )

Institute of Finance and Accounting
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London NW1 4SA
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+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Colin Mayer

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)

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