Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2475150
 


 



Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners


Ian Appel


Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Todd A. Gormley


Washington University in St. Louis

Donald B. Keim


University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School

February 6, 2016

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Passive institutional investors are an increasingly important component of U.S. stock ownership. To examine whether and by which mechanisms passive investors influence firms’ governance, we exploit variation in ownership by passive mutual funds associated with stock assignments to the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes. Our findings suggest that passive mutual funds influence firms’ governance choices, resulting in more independent directors, removal of takeover defenses, and more equal voting rights. Passive investors appear to exert influence through their large voting blocs, and consistent with the observed governance differences increasing firm value, passive ownership is associated with improvements in firms’ longer-term performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 77

Keywords: corporate governance, institutional ownership, passive funds, performance

JEL Classification: D22, G23, G30, G34, G35


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Date posted: August 3, 2014 ; Last revised: March 15, 2016

Suggested Citation

Appel, Ian and Gormley, Todd A. and Keim, Donald B., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (February 6, 2016). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2475150 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475150

Contact Information

Ian Appel (Contact Author)
Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )
Carroll School of Management
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States
Todd A. Gormley
Washington University in St. Louis ( email )
One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
(314) 935-7171 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.gormley.info
Donald B. Keim
University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7685 (Phone)
215-898-6200 (Fax)

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