The Consequences of Shifting the IPO Offer Pricing Power from Securities Regulators to Market Participants in Weak Institutional Environments: Evidence from China
55 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2014 Last revised: 9 Oct 2016
Date Written: September 30, 2016
We examine the consequences of shifting the IPO offer pricing power from securities regulators to market participants in a representative weak investor protection country, China. We show IPO offer prices relative to reported earnings are less depressed when determined by market participants than by securities regulators. IPO firms are also less likely to select a low quality auditor or inflate the pre-IPO earnings when IPO offer prices are determined by market participants. However, we find no evidence that IPO offerings are more likely to be overpriced when offer prices are determined by market participants. Furthermore, IPO firms’ financial reporting choices made at the time of the IPO have a long lasting impact on the firms’ subsequent financial reporting quality. Overall, our results contribute to the ongoing debate on the appropriate roles of securities regulators versus market forces in protecting public investors in markets with weak institutional environments.
Keywords: IPO regulation; financial reporting quality; auditor choice; IPO offer pricing
JEL Classification: G38, M41, M43
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation