Rethinking Compliance

47 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2014 Last revised: 18 Jan 2016

See all articles by Anne Riley

Anne Riley


D. Daniel Sokol

USC Gould School of Law; USC Marshall School of Business

Date Written: August 25, 2014


This article addresses optimal deterrence and its limits in the context of creating a more effective mechanism for antitrust compliance to take hold in businesses. We suggest proactive encouragement of compliance programs. Antitrust authorities should work with the business community to create a regulatory scheme that rewards good behavior while punishing bad behavior. To do so, antitrust authorities need to understand how to create and sustain compliance efforts within a company. The proper role of an antitrust compliance program should be to ensure compliance with the law and to promote ethical behaviour by and between companies as part of good corporate governance. Antitrust authorities should play a role in encouraging and supporting this, in the same way other enforcement authorities do (for example in relation to FCPA/anti-bribery enforcement). We argue that from a policy perspective, antitrust enforcement should not just be about punishment but about changing normative values within organizations.

Keywords: compliance, cartels, leniency, antitrust, competition, collusion

JEL Classification: K21, L41, M14

Suggested Citation

Riley, Anne and Sokol, D. Daniel, Rethinking Compliance (August 25, 2014). 3 J. of Antitrust Enforcement 31 (2015), University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 16-3, Available at SSRN: or

Anne Riley

Independent ( email )

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

USC Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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