Power-Sharing and Institutional Sequencing

39 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2014

See all articles by Matthew Charles Wilson

Matthew Charles Wilson

West Virginia University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 3, 2014

Abstract

There are myriad explanations for the existence of political institutions in authoritarian regimes, providing a valuable starting point for differentiating the causes for their emergence from their contemporary roles. This paper considers whether there is an order to the development of authoritarian institutions -- specifically, support parties and legislatures. It evaluates the argument that violence in non-institutionalized autocracy first prompts a contracting arrangement that promotes horizontal accountability, which legislatures provide. The argument also suggests that support parties are related to more diffuse violence, which necessitates a transition to more vertical accountability. Using the predicted probabilities of different forms of domestic violence, it shows that legislatures are significantly more likely to occur when the probability of civil conflict is high. Furthermore, a duration analysis confirms that transitions to legislatures are associated with authoritarian longevity, which is not true of transitions to a support party. Underscoring the discussion of institutional sequencing is a broader argument about the role of order in political regime change.

Keywords: authoritarianism, sequence, transition, duration

Suggested Citation

Wilson, Matthew Charles, Power-Sharing and Institutional Sequencing (August 3, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2475963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475963

Matthew Charles Wilson (Contact Author)

West Virginia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

PO Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

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