Cones of Games Arising from Market Entry Problems

CentER Working Paper No. 44

9 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2000

See all articles by Rodica Branzei

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Judith Timmer

University of Twente - Department of Applied Mathematics

Date Written: April 2000

Abstract

Market entry situations are modelled, where an entrepreneur has to decide for a collection of markets which market to enter and which not. The entrepreneur can improve his prior information by making use of a group of informants, each of them knowing the situation in one or more markets. For such a market entry situation a related cooperative game is introduced, which can be helpful in dealing with the question of how to share the reward of cooperation. The games arising turn out to be elements of the cone of information market games which were introduced for another economic context. This implies that the cooperative solutions of these games have interesting properties. Extra attention is paid to the subcone of information market games arising from market entry situations where for each market only one informant knows the state of the market.

Keywords: cooperative games, information, market entry, information market games

JEL Classification: C71, D89

Suggested Citation

Branzei, Rodica and Tijs, Stef H. and Timmer, Judith, Cones of Games Arising from Market Entry Problems (April 2000). CentER Working Paper No. 44, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=247669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.247669

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )

Carol I Blvd, Nr.11
Lasi
Romania

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

Judith Timmer (Contact Author)

University of Twente - Department of Applied Mathematics ( email )

P.O. Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
Netherlands

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