Economic Analysis of Criminal Procedure

Forthcoming in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (F. Parisi, ed., 2015)

Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-48

22 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2014 Last revised: 12 Aug 2014

See all articles by Keith N. Hylton

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: August 7, 2014

Abstract

This essay reviews the economics of criminal procedure, proceeding through four topics in the literature. First, I review the implications of substantive criminal law theories for criminal procedure. The second part discusses the error cost model of criminal procedure, which is the dominant framework and posits that criminal procedure rules are designed to minimize the sum of error and administrative costs. The third part reviews the public choice model of criminal procedure. Under this model, criminal procedure rules are designed largely to regulate rent seeking activity. The last part of this paper is a brief discussion of some of the empirical work on procedure that bears directly on deterrence and welfare effects.

Keywords: criminal law, criminal procedure, econmics of criminal law, optimal deterrence, complete deterrence, error cost model, public choice model

JEL Classification: K00, K14, K19, K39

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Economic Analysis of Criminal Procedure (August 7, 2014). Forthcoming in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (F. Parisi, ed., 2015); Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-48. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477425

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

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