Self-Control, Social Preferences and the Effect of Delayed Payments

44 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2014 Last revised: 19 Mar 2016

See all articles by Anna Dreber

Anna Dreber

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

David G. Rand

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: February 17, 2016

Abstract

We extend the dual-self model to include altruistic preferences. This explains (1) why people may have preferences for equality in the laboratory but not in the field, (2) why intermediate donations may occur in dictator games, (3) why cognitive load and time pressure may increase giving, and (4) why people often "avoid the ask" from solicitors when they would have donated if avoiding was impossible. Also, our model predicts that (5) delaying payments to both parties in the dictator game decreases giving. We verify this prediction in two large-scale experiments: people give less when payoffs are delayed.

Keywords: altruism, self-control, delay, dual-self model

Suggested Citation

Dreber, Anna and Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. and Rand, David G., Self-Control, Social Preferences and the Effect of Delayed Payments (February 17, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477454 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2477454

Anna Dreber

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

David K. Levine (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

David G. Rand

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.daverand.org

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