Self-Control, Social Preferences and the Effect of Delayed Payments
44 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2014 Last revised: 19 Mar 2016
Date Written: February 17, 2016
We extend the dual-self model to include altruistic preferences. This explains (1) why people may have preferences for equality in the laboratory but not in the field, (2) why intermediate donations may occur in dictator games, (3) why cognitive load and time pressure may increase giving, and (4) why people often "avoid the ask" from solicitors when they would have donated if avoiding was impossible. Also, our model predicts that (5) delaying payments to both parties in the dictator game decreases giving. We verify this prediction in two large-scale experiments: people give less when payoffs are delayed.
Keywords: altruism, self-control, delay, dual-self model
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