Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act

Abstract

In May 2014, the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy published a series of papers as part of a multiauthor collaboration organized by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. That series of papers, together with a forthcoming article by Hester Peirce, reviews ways in which U.S. federal regulatory agencies engage in regulatory-like actions while avoiding requirements outlined by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and regulatory oversight by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This Article summarizes lessons from the series and offers reform proposals that may improve upon the current situation.

Keywords: OIRA, Regulation, regulatory impact analysis, benefit-cost analysis, regulatory process, regulatory review

JEL Classification: K2, L51