Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act

25 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2014 Last revised: 25 Sep 2014

See all articles by John Graham

John Graham

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA)

James Broughel

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: June 1, 2014

Abstract

In May 2014, the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy published a series of papers as part of a multiauthor collaboration organized by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. That series of papers, together with a forthcoming article by Hester Peirce, reviews ways in which U.S. federal regulatory agencies engage in regulatory-like actions while avoiding requirements outlined by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and regulatory oversight by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This Article summarizes lessons from the series and offers reform proposals that may improve upon the current situation.

Keywords: OIRA, Regulation, regulatory impact analysis, benefit-cost analysis, regulatory process, regulatory review

JEL Classification: K2, L51

Suggested Citation

Graham, John and Broughel, James, Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act (June 1, 2014). Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Federalist Edition, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477642

John Graham (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

James Broughel

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mercatus.org/scholars/james-broughel

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