Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions

SSRI Working Paper No. 2017R

9 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2000

See all articles by Philip A. Haile

Philip A. Haile

Yale University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Sushil Bikhchandani

University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management

John G. Riley

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: October 9, 2000

Abstract

We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in symmetric separating strategies in Milgrom and Weber's (1982) model of English auctions. There is a continuum of such equilibria. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber is that in which bids are maximal. Only in the case of pure private values does a restriction to weakly undominated strategies select a unique equilibrium. This has important implications for empirical studies of English auctions, particularly outside the pure private values paradigm.

JEL Classification: D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Haile, Philip A. and Bikhchandani, Sushil and Riley, John G., Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions (October 9, 2000). SSRI Working Paper No. 2017R. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=247794 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.247794

Philip A. Haile (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8264
United States
203-432-3568 (Phone)
203-432-6323 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Sushil Bikhchandani

University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States
310-206-2686 (Phone)
310-825-1581 (Fax)

John G. Riley

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
101
Abstract Views
1,056
rank
260,096
PlumX Metrics