The Problem of ‘Underweight’ Shareholders

The New York Times, 5 August 2014

4 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2014

Date Written: August 5, 2014

Abstract

Western models of corporate governance assume that all shareholders want their company’s share price to grow. Today, however, there are "underweight" investors who, perversely, desire some of their stock holdings to drop in value or underperform their peers.

This article discusses the governance implications of "underweighting" in investment management and suggests remedial actions.

Keywords: underweighting, corporate governance, stewardship, investing

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Wong, Simon C. Y., The Problem of ‘Underweight’ Shareholders (August 5, 2014). The New York Times, 5 August 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2478888

Simon C. Y. Wong (Contact Author)

Northwestern University School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

London School of Economics

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/simon-wong.htm

Tapestry Networks ( email )

404 Wyman St.
Suite 225
Waltham, MA 02451
United States

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