Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2478888
 


 



The Problem of ‘Underweight’ Shareholders


Simon C. Y. Wong


Northwestern University School of Law; London School of Economics; McKinsey & Co. Inc.

August 5, 2014

The New York Times, 5 August 2014

Abstract:     
Western models of corporate governance assume that all shareholders want their company’s share price to grow. Today, however, there are "underweight" investors who, perversely, desire some of their stock holdings to drop in value or underperform their peers.

This article discusses the governance implications of "underweighting" in investment management and suggests remedial actions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 4

Keywords: underweighting, corporate governance, stewardship, investing

JEL Classification: G30, G34


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Date posted: August 12, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Wong, Simon C. Y., The Problem of ‘Underweight’ Shareholders (August 5, 2014). The New York Times, 5 August 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2478888

Contact Information

Simon C. Y. Wong (Contact Author)
Northwestern University School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/simon-wong.htm

McKinsey & Co. Inc. ( email )
1 Jermyn Street
London, England SW1Y 4UH
United Kingdom
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