How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption

Discussion Paper Series, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy, University of Freiburg, No. 2014-02

11 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2014

See all articles by Matthias Bujko

Matthias Bujko

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Christian Fischer

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Tim Krieger

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Daniel Meierrieks

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 11, 2014

Abstract

Large-scale land acquisitions, or "land grabs", concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.

Keywords: Large-scale land acquisitions, land grabbing, foreign investments, weak institutions, property rights, corruption, large-N study

JEL Classification: F21, O13, Q15, Q34

Suggested Citation

Bujko, Matthias and Fischer, Christian and Krieger, Tim and Meierrieks, Daniel, How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption (August 11, 2014). Discussion Paper Series, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy, University of Freiburg, No. 2014-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2478959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2478959

Matthias Bujko

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

Christian Fischer

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

Tim Krieger (Contact Author)

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

University of Freiburg
Wilhelmstr. 1b
Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wguth.uni-freiburg.de

Daniel Meierrieks

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer
50
Berlin, D-10785
Germany

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