College Admissions Problem with Ties and Flexible Quotas

22 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2014 Last revised: 5 Oct 2015

See all articles by Ignacio Ríos

Ignacio Ríos

University of Chile - Engineering Department

Tomás Larroucau

Sistema Único de Admisión, CRUCH

Giorgiogiulio Parra

University of Chile - Engineering Department

Roberto Cominetti

University of Chile - Engineering Department

Date Written: August 28, 2014

Abstract

We study an extension of the classical college admission problem where applicants have strict preferences but careers may include ties in their preference lists. We present an algorithm which enables us to find stable assignments without breaking ties rules, but considering flexible quotas. We investigate the properties of this algorithm -- stability, optimality -- and we show that the resulting algorithm is neither monotone nor strategy-proof. The mechanism is used to solve real instances of the Chilean college admission problem. Among our results, we show that the welfare of students is increased if flexible quotas and a student-optimal assignment are combined. Finally, we argue why such assignment may be desirable in the Chilean context.

Keywords: college admissions problem, stable assignment, flexible quotas, unstrict preferences

JEL Classification: C78, I21

Suggested Citation

Ríos, Ignacio and Larroucau, Tomás and Parra, Giorgiogiulio and Cominetti, Roberto, College Admissions Problem with Ties and Flexible Quotas (August 28, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2478998 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2478998

Ignacio Ríos (Contact Author)

University of Chile - Engineering Department ( email )

Republica 701 Santiago
Chile

Tomás Larroucau

Sistema Único de Admisión, CRUCH ( email )

Moneda 673, Piso 8
Santiago, RM
Chile

Giorgiogiulio Parra

University of Chile - Engineering Department ( email )

Republica 701 Santiago
Chile

Roberto Cominetti

University of Chile - Engineering Department ( email )

Republica 701 Santiago
Chile

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