The Obligation to Exercise Discretion in Warfare: Why Autonomous Weapon Systems are Unlawful

Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy 244 (Nehal Bhuta et al, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2016)

41 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2014 Last revised: 30 Dec 2017

See all articles by Eliav Lieblich

Eliav Lieblich

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Eyal Benvenisti

University of Cambridge - Lauterpacht Centre for International Law

Date Written: August 13, 2014

Abstract

This Chapter analyzes the current discourse on the legality of autonomous weapons (‘killer robots’) under international law, and seeks to offer a novel prism through which to discuss the challenges that such systems pose: namely, we advance the view that modern warfare is an exercise of executive power by states against individuals and should thus be subject to basic notions of administrative law, chiefly the obligation to exercise proper administrative discretion. When autonomous weapons are deployed, state power is exercised against individuals through a computerized proxy. When the power to make ‘decisions’ that affect basic rights is transferred to computer systems such as autonomous weapons, the duty to exercise proper administrative discretion is compromised. Chiefly, this is because at least in the foreseeable future, such machines would be incapable of exercising ‘true’ administrative discretion. This problem is especially acute when autonomous weapons are deployed in asymmetric settings, where civilians are put at risk, but also, arguably, when deployed against enemy combatants.

Keywords: International Law, International Humanitarian Law, Lethal Autonomous Weapons, Robots, International Human Rights Law, Administrative Law

Suggested Citation

Lieblich, Eliav and Benvenisti, Eyal, The Obligation to Exercise Discretion in Warfare: Why Autonomous Weapon Systems are Unlawful (August 13, 2014). Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy 244 (Nehal Bhuta et al, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2479808 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2479808

Eliav Lieblich (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv, IL
Israel

Eyal Benvenisti

University of Cambridge - Lauterpacht Centre for International Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

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