Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Group Longevity

Journal of Peace Research, Forthcoming

14 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2014 Last revised: 12 Oct 2014

See all articles by Brian J. Phillips

Brian J. Phillips

University of Essex - Department of Government

Date Written: August 14, 2014

Abstract

Terrorist organizations often attack each other, but we know little about how this affects the involved groups. Some states encourage or turn a blind eye toward terrorist group interorganizational violence, hoping that it destroys at least one of the groups involved. This paper argues that – contrary to the wishes of such governments – violent rivalries can contribute to the longevity of participating terrorist groups. Violent rivalries encourage civilians to take a side, inspire innovation, provide new incentives to group members, and spoil peace talks. Some of these mechanisms should be especially likely between rivals of different political goals (inter-field rivalries), instead of between rivals seeking the same primary goal (intra-field rivalries). Illustrative cases in Colombia and Northern Ireland show that the theorized mechanisms occur in diverse environments. Quantitative global analysis of terrorist groups from 1987-2005, using original data on interorganizational violence, suggests that violent rivalries are generally associated with group longevity. Further analysis suggests that when rivalries are disaggregated by type, only inter-field rivalries are positively associated with group longevity. Participation in violent rivalry is never found to increase a group’s chance of ending. The results suggest the importance of studying interorganizational dynamics, and raise questions about the notion of encouraging a violent rivalry as a way to hurt an involved terrorist group.

Keywords: terrorism, terrorist organizations, event history analysis, organizational dynamics

Suggested Citation

Phillips, Brian J., Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Group Longevity (August 14, 2014). Journal of Peace Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2480828

Brian J. Phillips (Contact Author)

University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
151
Abstract Views
2,113
rank
192,082
PlumX Metrics