Stable and Sustainable Global Tax Coordination with Leviathan Governments

7 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2014

See all articles by Thomas Eichner

Thomas Eichner

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines

Rudiger Pethig

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: July 30, 2014

Abstract

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.’s model.

Keywords: global tax coordination, repeated game, sustainability, stability

JEL Classification: H71, H77

Suggested Citation

Eichner, Thomas and Pethig, Rudiger, Stable and Sustainable Global Tax Coordination with Leviathan Governments (July 30, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4909. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2482988

Thomas Eichner

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines ( email )

Hoelderlinstrasse 3
57068 Siegen
Germany

Rudiger Pethig (Contact Author)

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines ( email )

Hoelderlinstrasse 3
57068 Siegen
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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