Do Busy Directors and CEOs Shirk Their Responsibilities? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

56 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2014

See all articles by Bradley W. Benson

Bradley W. Benson

Ball State University - Department of Finance and Insurance

Wallace N. Davidson

Southern Illinois University - Department of Finance

Travis Davidson

Ohio University - Department of Finance

Hongxia Wang

Coastal Carolina University

Date Written: August 19, 2014

Abstract

We examine the effects of busy directors on merger premiums and conclude that busy directors are not uniformly detrimental. We provide evidence that busy CEOs of acquirer firms are associated with lower premiums suggesting they do not shirk their responsibilities. Busy CEOs of target firms either accept lower premiums or do not play a significant role in determining the price, indicating they may either shirk or have hidden self-incentives. We find that when the majority of directors in target firms are busy, they negotiate better deals. The results show that busyness does not fully explain whether a CEO or director shirks responsibility. Additionally, our results confirm previous findings that the market reacts more negatively to high merger premiums.

Keywords: Multiple directorships, Merger and acquisition, Acquirer busy CEO, Target busy CEO

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Benson, Bradley W. and Davidson, Wallace N. and Davidson, Travis and Wang, Hongxia, Do Busy Directors and CEOs Shirk Their Responsibilities? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions (August 19, 2014). Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2483234

Bradley W. Benson

Ball State University - Department of Finance and Insurance ( email )

Muncie, IN 47306-0340
United States
765-285-5299 (Phone)
765-285-4314 (Fax)

Wallace N. Davidson

Southern Illinois University - Department of Finance ( email )

Mail Code 4626
Carbondale, IL 62901-4626
United States
618-453-1429 (Phone)
618-453-5626 (Fax)

Travis Davidson (Contact Author)

Ohio University - Department of Finance ( email )

640 Copeland
Athens, OH 45701
United States

Hongxia Wang

Coastal Carolina University ( email )

P.O. Box 261954
Conway, SC 29528-6054
United States
843-349-4146 (Phone)

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