Regional and Ownership Drivers of Bank Efficiency

30 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2014 Last revised: 5 Sep 2017

See all articles by Natalya Zelenyuk

Natalya Zelenyuk

University of Queensland

Valentin Zelenyuk

University of Queensland

Date Written: October 31, 2014

Abstract

The banking sector plays a major role in any economy, and it played a critical role in transition of Ukraine from state capitalism to a market economy. In this work, we investigate the hypothesis that, despite the tremendous growth and apparent prosperity that existed before the country was hit by the Global Financial Crisis, the Ukrainian banking industry already suffered from significant inefficiencies. In this work, we estimate the intermediation-type efficiency of individual banks, and analyse how various bank-specific factors (e.g., type of ownership, regional aspects, level of risk as per Basel Accords, business model, size) explain the differences in the estimated levels of inefficiency across banks. Among other results, we find strong support for the conclusions from the agency theory: we find that banks that were 100% foreign-owned were significantly more efficient than locally-owned and partially foreign-owned banks, on average and ceteris paribus and, in particular, regardless of whether they were headquartered in the capital city or in a region, in the East or in the West of the country.

Keywords: Banking, Efficiency, DEA, Truncated regression, Bootstrap, Ownership

JEL Classification: C1, C13, C14, G2

Suggested Citation

Zelenyuk, Natalya and Zelenyuk, Valentin, Regional and Ownership Drivers of Bank Efficiency (October 31, 2014). 27th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2014 Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2485183 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2485183

Natalya Zelenyuk (Contact Author)

University of Queensland ( email )

St Lucia
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia

Valentin Zelenyuk

University of Queensland ( email )

St Lucia
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia

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