Aggregate Litigation Goes Private

23 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2014 Last revised: 23 Sep 2014

See all articles by Adam S. Zimmerman

Adam S. Zimmerman

Loyola Law School Los Angeles

Dana Remus

University of North Carolina School of Law

Date Written: August 22, 2014

Abstract

In Disaggregative Mechanisms, Professor Jaime Dodge documents how corporate defendants increasingly design their own mass resolution systems to avoid collective litigation — what she calls “disaggregative” dispute resolution. According to Dodge, such schemes promise benefits not only to putative defendants, but also to plaintiffs — resolving disputes quickly, handling large volumes of claims predictably, and sometimes, offering more compensation than would be available through aggregate litigation. She observes, however, that these systems also risk underdeterrence. Dodge concludes by endorsing disaggregative mechanisms while suggesting a need for more public oversight.

In the following response, we argue that, left unregulated, such high volume claim systems threaten transparency, deterrence, and even the rule of law. We therefore agree with Dodge’s call for public oversight. But we observe that a number of policing and oversight mechanisms already exist. Today, lawmakers and regulators police collective arbitration and private settlement funds, in a wide variety of areas — from financial and environmental regulations to employment and consumer protection laws. After reviewing the ways that policymakers currently regulate corporate dispute resolution, we examine their effectiveness by exploring two regulated private settlement systems in more detail: (1) regulations developed by the Obama Administration that require airlines to offer “liquidated damages” using a preapproved settlement grid when they overbook customers on a flight and (2) regulations imposed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency following accusations that many of the nation’s largest banks executed “robo-signed” mortgages that required banks to perform a detailed “independent foreclosure review” of past loans with borrowers. These case studies demonstrate both the challenges to, and opportunities for, government bodies that attempt to encourage sound regulation of mass private settlement systems without compromising their potential contributions to increased access, equality, and efficiency.

Suggested Citation

Zimmerman, Adam S. and Remus, Dana, Aggregate Litigation Goes Private (August 22, 2014). 63 Emory Law Journal 1317 (2014), Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-38, UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2485416, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2485416

Adam S. Zimmerman (Contact Author)

Loyola Law School Los Angeles ( email )

919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.lls.edu/aboutus/facultyadministration/faculty/facultylists-z/zimmermanadam/

Dana Remus

University of North Carolina School of Law ( email )

160 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC 27599

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