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International Delegation and State Disaggregation

31 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2014  

Tom Ginsburg

University of Chicago Law School

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Following Voigt and Salzberger (2002) this paper considers the tradeoff between international and domestic delegation devices, and argues that the two are largely complements rather than substitutes. It then explores the domestic separation of powers as an explanatory factor in understanding different levels of international delegation across states. It argues that the domestic separation of powers is a driving factor in propensity to delegate, and provides some empirical evidence in this regard. Federal states and those with bicameral legislatures are more likely to sign treaties and join international organizations. Presidential systems, however, are no more likely to do so than parliamentary ones.

Suggested Citation

Ginsburg, Tom, International Delegation and State Disaggregation (2009). Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2487203

Tom Ginsburg (Contact Author)

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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