31 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2014
Date Written: 2009
Following Voigt and Salzberger (2002) this paper considers the tradeoff between international and domestic delegation devices, and argues that the two are largely complements rather than substitutes. It then explores the domestic separation of powers as an explanatory factor in understanding different levels of international delegation across states. It argues that the domestic separation of powers is a driving factor in propensity to delegate, and provides some empirical evidence in this regard. Federal states and those with bicameral legislatures are more likely to sign treaties and join international organizations. Presidential systems, however, are no more likely to do so than parliamentary ones.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ginsburg, Tom, International Delegation and State Disaggregation (2009). Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2487203