Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids

40 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2014 Last revised: 13 Nov 2017

See all articles by Olga Gorelkina

Olga Gorelkina

University of Liverpool - Management School (ULMS)

Date Written: August 1, 2014

Abstract

This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the knowledge of colluders’ identities or distributions of valuations, in which sense it is entirely detail-free.

Keywords: Bidder collusion, detail-free auctions, Vickrey auction

JEL Classification: D82, C72, D44

Suggested Citation

Gorelkina, Olga, Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids (August 1, 2014). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2014/10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2487743 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2487743

Olga Gorelkina (Contact Author)

University of Liverpool - Management School (ULMS) ( email )

Chatham Street
Liverpool, L69 7ZH
United Kingdom

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