A Quiet Revolution in Corporate Governance: An Examination of Voluntary Best Practice Governance Policies

25 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2014

Date Written: September 2014

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of several voluntary best practice corporate governance principles on firm performance and firm risk. Using a sample of Standard & Poor's/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index firms from 2003–2010, I show that firms with individual director election and detailed disclosure of voting results in director elections have a higher firm value or performance. Firms with independent chairman, majority voting, and detailed disclosure of voting results in director elections have lower idiosyncratic risk. In addition, the results from the panel regression show that detailed disclosure of voting results in director election leads to lower systematic and total risk.

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Baulkaran, Vishaal, A Quiet Revolution in Corporate Governance: An Examination of Voluntary Best Practice Governance Policies (September 2014). International Review of Finance, Vol. 14, Issue 3, pp. 459-483, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2488233 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12017

Vishaal Baulkaran (Contact Author)

University of Lethbridge ( email )

4401 University Dr.
Lethbridge, Alberta T1K 3M4
Canada
403-329-2074 (Phone)

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