Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Banking Competition and Stability: The Role of Leverage

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2014-048

European Banking Center Discussion Paper Series No. 2014-009

41 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2014 Last revised: 2 Sep 2014

Xavier Freixas

Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Kebin Ma

University of Warwick - Finance Group

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 28, 2014

Abstract

This paper reexamines the classical issue of the possible trade-offs between banking competition and financial stability by highlighting different types of risk and the role of leverage. By means of a simple model we show that competition can affect portfolio risk, insolvency risk, liquidity risk, and systemic risk differently. The effect depends crucially on banks’ liability structure, on whether banks are financed by insured retail deposits or by uninsured wholesale debts, and on whether the indebtness is exogenous or endogenous. In particular we suggest that, while in a classical originate-to-hold banking industry competition might increase financial stability, the opposite can be true for an originate-to-distribute banking industry of a larger fraction of market short-term funding. This leads us to revisit the existing empirical literature using a more precise classification of risk. Our theoretical model therefore helps to clarify a number of apparently contradictory empirical results and proposes new ways to analyze the impact of banking competition on financial stability.

Keywords: Banking Competition, Financial Stability, Leverage

JEL Classification: G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Freixas, Xavier and Ma, Kebin, Banking Competition and Stability: The Role of Leverage (August 28, 2014). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2014-048. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2488426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2488426

Xavier Freixas (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2726 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~freixas

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~freixas/more/personal1.htm

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Kebin Ma

University of Warwick - Finance Group ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd
Coventry, CV4 7AL
Great Britain

HOME PAGE: http://www.kebinma.com

Paper statistics

Downloads
207
Rank
58,879
Abstract Views
1,111