Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative

Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 42, pp. 135-178 (2014)

44 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2014

See all articles by Alexander A. Guerrero

Alexander A. Guerrero

Rutgers University, New Brunswick - Department of Philosophy

Date Written: August 28, 2014

Abstract

It is widely accepted that electoral representative democracy is better — along a number of different normative dimensions — than any other alternative lawmaking political arrangement. It is not typically seen as much of a competition: it is also widely accepted that the only legitimate alternative to electoral representative democracy is some form of direct democracy, but direct democracy — we are told — would lead to bad policy. This article makes the case that there is a legitimate alternative system — one that uses lotteries, not elections, to select political officials — that would be better than electoral representative democracy. Part I diagnoses two significant failings of modern-day systems of electoral representative government: the failure of responsiveness and the failure of good governance. The argument offered suggests that these flaws run deep, so that even significant and politically unlikely reforms with respect to campaign finance and election law would make little difference. Although my distillation of the argument is novel, the basic themes will likely be familiar. I anticipate the initial response to the argument may be familiar as well: the Churchillian shrug. Parts II, III, and IV of this article represent the beginning of an effort to move past that response, to think about alternative political systems that might avoid some of the problems with the electoral representative system without introducing new and worse problems. In the second and third parts of the article, I outline an alternative political system, the lottocratic system, and present some of the virtues of such a system. In the fourth part of the article, I consider some possible problems for the system. The overall aims of this article are to raise worries for electoral systems of government, to present the lottocratic system and to defend the view that this system might be a normatively attractive alternative, removing a significant hurdle to taking a non-electoral system of government seriously as a possible improvement to electoral democracy.

Keywords: representative government, democratic theory, lottery, institutional design

Suggested Citation

Guerrero, Alexander A., Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative (August 28, 2014). Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 42, pp. 135-178 (2014), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2488791

Alexander A. Guerrero (Contact Author)

Rutgers University, New Brunswick - Department of Philosophy ( email )

New Brunswick, NJ
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.alexguerrero.org

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