Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy: Menu-Auctions with Imperfect Competition

UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 464

Posted: 16 Nov 2000

See all articles by K. C. Fung

K. C. Fung

University of California at Santa Cruz

Date Written: October 2000

Abstract

This paper applies the Dixit-Grossman-Helpman (1994, 1997) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Dixit-Grossman-Helpman politically-determined ex-port subsidy is identical to the Brander-Spencer rent-shifting export subsidy. The politically-determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator. Joint lobbying is also considered and the results indicate that joint lobbying on export subsidy improves domestic welfare due to the elimination of the resource wasted in lobbying.

Keywords: Lobbying, Strategic Trade Policy, Imperfect Competition

JEL Classification: F12, F13

Suggested Citation

Fung, K.C., Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy: Menu-Auctions with Imperfect Competition (October 2000). UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 464, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=249001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.249001

K.C. Fung (Contact Author)

University of California at Santa Cruz ( email )

Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-3273 (Phone)
831-459-5900 (Fax)

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