Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power

52 Pages Posted: 3 Sep 2014 Last revised: 16 Apr 2022

See all articles by Laurent Bouton

Laurent Bouton

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Queen Mary University of London

Frederic Malherbe

University College London - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 2014

Abstract

A group of agents wants to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We analyze a simple voting system - majority rule with veto power (Veto) - that essentially resolves this tension, for it combines the advantageous properties of both majority and unanimity rules. We argue that our results shed new light on the evolution of voting rules in the EU institutions and could help to inform debates about policy reforms in cases such as juries in the US.

Suggested Citation

Bouton, Laurent and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol and Malherbe, Frederic, Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power (August 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20417, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2490831

Laurent Bouton (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Lincoln's Inn Fields
Mile End Rd.
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/aniollls/

Frederic Malherbe

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

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