If at First You Don't Succeed: An Experimental Investigation of the Impact of Repitition Options on Corporate Takeovers
65 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2015
Date Written: August 1, 2000
This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when a significant probability of resolicitation was introduced: The option to resolicit reduced the costs of free riding fairly substantially. Both the raider offers and the shareholder tendering responses generally exceeded equilibrium predictions.
Keywords: corporate takeovers, experimental economics, resolicit
JEL Classification: G3, C7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation