Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals

44 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2015 Last revised: 8 Feb 2015

See all articles by Larry D. Wall

Larry D. Wall

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta - Research Department

Robert Eisenbeis Eisenbeis


Date Written: September 1999


The debate over modernizing the financial structure is raising questions about the merits of modernizing the financial regulatory structure. Regulatory structure is important because an almost unavoidable feature of our current system of government is that Congress assigns multiple goals that sometimes have conflicting policy implications to the regulatory agencies. The structure of the agencies is important to the resolution of these conflicts. Responsibility for two or more goals that have conflicting implications may be assigned to a single agency that is likely to resolve the conflict with a consistent set of policies based on the agency's priorities. Alternatively, the goals may be assigned to more than one agency, an action that often results in the conflicts being debated in the public arena but that may also result in the agencies' implementing inconsistent policies. This paper uses the problem of goal conflicts to provide a framework for evaluating alternative regulatory structures.

Keywords: regulatory structure, financial services

JEL Classification: G28, L51

Suggested Citation

Wall, Larry D. and Eisenbeis, Robert Eisenbeis, Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals (September 1999). FRB Atlanta Working Paper Series No. 1999-12. Available at SSRN: or

Larry D. Wall (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta - Research Department ( email )

1000 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States
404-498-8937 (Phone)
404-498-8956 (Fax)


Robert Eisenbeis Eisenbeis

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

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