The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment

Tilburg University, CentER Working Paper No. 2000-102

30 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2001

See all articles by Eline van der Heijden

Eline van der Heijden

Tilburg University, CentER

Erling Moxnes

Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF)

Date Written: October 2000

Abstract

With regard to globalor regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions? In this paper this possibility is investigated by the use of a novel design of a laboratory public bad experiment with a leader. Twelve groups of five subjects played the game twice, with two treatments: ten rounds with a leader and ten rounds without a leader. The order of the treatments was varied over groups. A significant (within-subject) effect of leadership is found. Followers invest on average 15 percent less in the public bad when there is a leader setting the good example as opposed to a situation with no leader. Furthermore, total payoffs turn out to be significantly higher in the leader treatment than in the no-leader treatment.

Keywords: Public Bad, Experiments, Leadership, Pollution

JEL Classification: C92, H41, Q30

Suggested Citation

van der Heijden, Eline and Moxnes, Erling, The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment (October 2000). Tilburg University, CentER Working Paper No. 2000-102. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=249142 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.249142

Eline Van der Heijden (Contact Author)

Tilburg University, CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Department of Economics
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands

Erling Moxnes

Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF) ( email )

Breiviksveien 40
Bergen, N-5045
Norway

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