Capital Flow Deflection

Abstract

This paper focuses on the coordination problem among borrowing countries imposing controls on capital inflows. In a simple model of capital flows and controls, we show that inflow restrictions distort international capital flows to other countries and that, in turn, such capital flow deflection may lead to a policy response. We then test the theory using data on inflow restrictions and gross capital inflows for a large sample of developing countries between 1995 and 2009. Our estimation yields strong evidence that capital controls deflect capital flows to other borrowing countries with similar economic characteristics. Notwithstanding these strong cross-border spillover effects, we do not find evidence of a policy response.

Keywords: Capital flows, Capital controls, Capital inflows, Spillovers, Econometric models, cross-border spillovers, policy response., capital flow, capital inflow, real gdp, growth rate, gdp growth, gdp growth rate, gdp per capita, capital control, capital outflows, management of capital flows, international capital flows, international capital, real effective exchange rate, capital market, capital account liberalization, cost of capital, capital account restrictions, exogenous shocks, volatile capital flows, volatility of capital flows, capital outflow, growth rates, volatile capital, domestic capital, determinants of capital flows, stock market, debt securities, bond yields, stringent capital contr

JEL Classification: F30, F40, F50