Bank Asset Reallocation and Sovereign Debt

38 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2014 Last revised: 10 Feb 2017

See all articles by Michele U. Fratianni

Michele U. Fratianni

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy; Universita' Politecnica delle Marche

Francesco Marchionne

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy; Università Politecnica delle Marche - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 15, 2014

Abstract

This paper examines how banks around the world have resized and reallocated their earning assets in response to the subprime and sovereign debt crises. We focus especially on the interaction between sovereign debt and the bank asset allocation process. After the crisis we observe a general substitution away from loans and in favor of securities. Our econometric findings corroborate that banks have readjusted the composition of their assets and the overall regulatory credit risk by substituting securities for loans. Banks, furthermore, have also been sensitive to those variables that are of direct interest to the regulator. The picture that emerges is a mutual protection pact regime, in which high-debt governments exert pressure on banks -- either through the regulatory system or through moral suasion -- to privilege the purchase of government securities over credit to the private sector in exchange for receiving protection against default.

Keywords: crisis, loans, regulator, securities, mutual protection pact

JEL Classification: G01, G11, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Fratianni, Michele and Marchionne, Francesco, Bank Asset Reallocation and Sovereign Debt (August 15, 2014). Kelley School of Business Research Paper No. 2014-35. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2491613 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2491613

Michele Fratianni (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )

Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-3360 (Phone)
812-855-3354 (Fax)

Universita' Politecnica delle Marche ( email )

Piazzale Martelli, 8
60121 Ancona
Italy
39-071-2207120 (Phone)

Francesco Marchionne

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )

1309 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405-1701
United States
01 812 855-3756 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://kelley.iu.edu/BEPP/Faculty/page14113.cfm?ID=47081

Università Politecnica delle Marche - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazzale Martelli, 8
Ancona, 60121
Italy
+39 071 2207120 (Phone)

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