Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2491744
 


 



The Power of Empty Promises: Quasidemocratic Institutions and Activism in China


Greg Distelhorst


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

September 24, 2015

Comparative Political Studies, Forthcoming
MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2014-19
Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2491744

Abstract:     
In authoritarian regimes, seemingly liberal reforms are often poorly implemented in practice. However, this study argues that even weak quasidemocratic institutions can offer resources to political activists. Formal institutions of participation offer politically anodyne frames for activism, allowing activists to distance themselves from political taboos. Weak institutions also allow activists to engineer institutional failures that in turn fuel legal and media-based campaigns. Evidence comes from the effects of China’s 2008 Open Government Information reform. A national field audit finds that local governments satisfy just 14% of citizen requests for basic information. Yet case studies show how Chinese activists exploited the same institution to extract concessions from government agencies and pursue policy change in disparate issue areas. These findings highlight the importance of looking beyond policy implementation to understand the effects of authoritarian institutions on political accountability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Non-Democratic Regimes, Political Institutions, Contentious Politics, China


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: September 6, 2014 ; Last revised: October 10, 2015

Suggested Citation

Distelhorst, Greg, The Power of Empty Promises: Quasidemocratic Institutions and Activism in China (September 24, 2015). Comparative Political Studies, Forthcoming; MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2014-19; Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2491744. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2491744 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2491744

Contact Information

Greg Distelhorst (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
77 Massachusetts Ave.
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.gregdistelhorst.com

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 658
Downloads: 177
Download Rank: 134,541