Tax Morale

25 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2014

See all articles by Erzo F. P. Luttmer

Erzo F. P. Luttmer

Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Monica Singhal

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2014

Abstract

Standard economic models of tax compliance have focused on enforcement-driven compliance. Notably, tax administrators also tend to place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of improving "tax morale" by encouraging voluntary compliance, creating a culture of compliance, and changing social norms. Tax morale does indeed appear to be an important component of compliance decisions, and there is strong evidence that tax morale operates through a variety of underlying channels. There is less evidence - to date - that indicates we know how to leverage these channels to improve compliance and revenue collection in a consistently successful way.

Suggested Citation

Luttmer, Erzo F.P. and Singhal, Monica, Tax Morale (September 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20458, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2492969

Erzo F.P. Luttmer (Contact Author)

Dartmouth College ( email )

Department of Economics
Hanover, NH 03755
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Monica Singhal

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-5062 (Phone)
617-496-6372 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://ksgfaculty.harvard.edu/monica_singhal

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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