Assessing the Asymmetric Effects on Branch Rivalry of Spanish Financial Sector Restructuring

Advances in Data Analysis and Classification - DOI: 10.1007/s11634-014-0186-2 (Forthcoming)

21 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2014 Last revised: 31 Jan 2015

See all articles by Marti Sagarra

Marti Sagarra

University of Girona - Department of Economics

Frank M.T.A. Busing

Leiden University

Cecilio Mar Molinero

University of Kent - Canterbury Campus

Josep Rialp

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Business Administration

Date Written: September 10, 2014

Abstract

Spanish financial institutions have been heavily affected by the banking crisis that began in 2008. Many of them, especially Spanish savings banks (or Cajas), had to merge with other institutions or had to be rescued. We address the question of up to what point the nature of competition in this sector has changed as a result of the crisis. Although institutions compete in many ways, we concentrate on their presence in the main street through bank branches open to the public (i.e., retail banking competition). Our measure of inter-firm rivalry is based on a geographical proximity measure that we calculate for the years 2008 (before the crisis) and 2012 (the last available data set). The technical approach is based on multidimensional unfolding, a methodology which allows us to graphically represent the asymmetric nature of such rivalry. These maps visualise the salient aspects of the system during the two dates analysed, and can be understood without a detailed technical knowledge.

Keywords: Strategy, Competitive market structure, Asymmetric competition, Multidimensional unfolding, Bank branches

JEL Classification: D00, C00

Suggested Citation

Sagarra, Marti and Busing, Frank M.T.A. and Mar Molinero, Cecilio and Rialp, Josep, Assessing the Asymmetric Effects on Branch Rivalry of Spanish Financial Sector Restructuring (September 10, 2014). Advances in Data Analysis and Classification - DOI: 10.1007/s11634-014-0186-2 (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2494331

Marti Sagarra (Contact Author)

University of Girona - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus de Montilivi
Girona, Girona 17071
Spain

Frank M.T.A. Busing

Leiden University ( email )

Postbus 9500
Leiden, Zuid Holland 2300 RA
Netherlands

Cecilio Mar Molinero

University of Kent - Canterbury Campus ( email )

Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NZ
United Kingdom

Josep Rialp

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Campus Bellaterra, Edifici B.
Bellaterra (Barcelona), 08193
Spain

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