State Judges and the Right to Vote

48 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2014 Last revised: 27 May 2016

Joshua Douglas

University of Kentucky - College of Law

Date Written: May 26, 2016

Abstract

State courts are paramount in defining the constitutional right to vote. This is in part because the right to vote is, in many ways, a state-based right protected under state constitutions. Yet our focus on state courts and on how state judges interpret the right to vote is sorely lacking. This article remedies that deficiency. It examines numerous state court cases involving voter ID, felon disenfranchisement, and the voting process, demonstrating that state courts vary in whether they rule broadly or narrowly toward voting rights. When state courts issue rulings broadly defining the constitutional right to vote, they best protect the most fundamental right in our democracy. On the other hand, state decisions that constrain voting to a narrower scope do harm to that ideal. Further, a preliminary analysis shows that liberal judges, as well as those who earn their seats through merit selection, are more likely to define the right to vote robustly as compared to their conservative and elected counterparts. Given that state judges impact our election system in significant ways through broad or narrow rulings on voting rights, we should advocate in favor of state courts and state judges who will broadly construe and protect the state-based constitutional right to vote.

Keywords: voting, right to vote, election, state courts, state judge, appointed judge, elected judge

Suggested Citation

Douglas, Joshua, State Judges and the Right to Vote (May 26, 2016). Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 77, No. 1, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2495078 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2495078

Joshua Douglas (Contact Author)

University of Kentucky - College of Law ( email )

620 S. Limestone Street
Lexington, KY 40506-0048
United States

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